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Abstract
Common models of synchronizable oscillatory systems consist of a collection of cou-
pled oscillators governed by a collection of differential equations. The ubiquitous Ku-
ramoto models rely on an a priori fixed connectivity pattern facilitates mutual com-
munication and influence between oscillators. In biological synchronizable systems,
like the mammalian suprachaismatic nucleus, enabling communication comes at a cost
— the organism expends energy creating and maintaining the system — linking their
development to evolutionary selection. Here, we introduce and analyze a new evolu-
tionary game theoretic framework modeling the behavior and evolution of systems of
coupled oscillators. Each oscillator in our model is characterized by a pair of dynamic
behavioral traits: an oscillatory phase and whether they connect and communicate to
other oscillators or not. Evolution of the system occurs along these dimensions, al-
lowing oscillators to change their phases and/or their communication strategies. We
measure success of mutations by comparing the benefit of phase synchronization to the
organism balanced against the cost of creating and maintaining connections between
the oscillators. Despite such a simple setup, this system exhibits a wealth of nontrivial
behaviors, mimicking different classical games – the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the snowdrift
game, and coordination games – as the landscape of the oscillators changes over time.
Despite such complexity, we find a surprisingly simple characterization of synchroniza-
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tion through connectivity and communication: if the benefit of synchronization B(0)
is greater than twice the cost c, B(0) > 2c, the organism will evolve towards complete
communication and phase synchronization. Taken together, our model demonstrates
possible evolutionary constraints on both the existence of a synchronized oscillatory
system and its overall connectivity.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory, Neuroscience, Kuramoto dilemma,
Cooperation, Synchronization
1. Introduction
The mammalian suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN) is a small center in the brain that
sits just above the optic chiasm. It receives light/dark signals from the optic nerve
and uses them to generate and maintain the organism’s circadian rhythm. Most of
the roughly 20,000 neurons in the SCN are oscillatory, exhibiting approximately 24–
hour rhythms. When their connectivity is disrupted, the neurons oscillate with about
the same period but randomly out of phase. However, when connectivity is intact,
the oscillations exhibit phase–locked synchronization [1]. A coherent circadian signal
within an organism confers many advantages, as it allows prediction of the light/dark
cycle. Mammals can anticipate changes in light that allow them to avoid predators,
find food, and generally increase their chances of survival. This basic principle informs
natural selection, but its impact on the structure of the SCN is unknown. Mechanisms
to generate circadian signals exist in a wide range of species – including mammals
[2], fruit flies [2], and cyanobacteria [3] – demonstrating that for many, the benefit of
such a system outweighs the evolutionary cost. However, for other organisms, like the
eyeless Mexican cavefish, developing a circadian clock would not confer the same kind
of benefit, and thus such a system did not evolve [4].
Mathematically, the mammalian SCN can be viewed as a network of coupled oscil-
lators. Understanding the synchronization of systems of coupled oscillators has a rich
history in the study of dynamical systems and applications in numerous fields [5, 6].
Decades of work has demonstrated the interplay between the properties of these sys-
tems and their ability to synchronize (surveys of the field include [7, 8, 9]). One of the
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simplest and most fruitful modeling approaches uses a differential equations system
model first introduced by Kuramoto [10]. If φj denotes the oscillatory parameter of
neuron j, and νj is its intrinsic frequency, the model reads:
φ˙j = νj +
∑
k
hjk sin(φk − φj),
where hjk is the coupling weight between neurons j and k. The effect of the coupling
term is to pull the oscillations of connected neurons towards one another.
While a simple and elegant analytic approach exists in the case of two oscilla-
tors, with more oscillators and more complicated connectivity, the problem becomes
(much) harder. While we can understand this system (and some variants) analytically
when the coupling topologies are particularly simple [8] and/or when we look at the
mean–field limit as the number of oscillators tends to infinity [8, 7], more complex
(and biologically plausible) connectivity patterns are not. For these cases, we must
rely on numerical approximation of solutions which can be both difficult and costly
computationally.
In this paper we approach the problem using techniques from the field of evolution-
ary game theory (EGT), which applies classical game theory to the study of evolving
populations [11, 12, 13]. The competitive advantages of various traits (or strategies, in
the language of EGT) that exist in the population are based on payoffs accrued from
pairwise or multi-person game interactions between connected individuals. Traits of
individuals are allowed to evolve over time, mimicking the biological process of natu-
ral selection. In this way, traits that confer an individual a competitive advantage have
greater success at propagating as the population evolves. This framework is designed
to answer questions about which population traits are more evolutionarily successful,
and under what conditions particular traits are advantageous. When we view the neu-
rons of the SCN as our population of interest, this EGT setup lends itself naturally to
our main question: what conditions allow for the synchronization behavior observed
in the mammalian SCN to arise? The benefit conferred to the organism from this syn-
chronization is shared by each neuron. However, the communication between neurons
that is necessary to ensure this synchronization behavior is costly. Thus, each neuron
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faces the choice of whether or not to expend the necessary effort to communicate and
aid the synchronization effort of the SCN. This kind of trade-off is captured in classic
cooperative dilemmas, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma game [13, 14].
Antonioni and Cardillo [15] incorporate EGT into the Kuramoto framework using a
modified version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In their model, neurons have two possible
strategies: cooperation, where neurons influence each other to move towards synchro-
nization, and defection, where they don’t. They use solutions of Kuramoto coupled
oscillator systems to calculate payoffs of a neuron’s strategy based the level of local
synchronization. In contrast to the typical EGT setup, where an individual’s payoff
is dependent on the current state of the system and the strategy of their opponent, in
this framework, a neuron will receive the same payoff regardless of the strategy of its
particular opponent as the payoff function depends on the the strategies and phases of
all of its neighbors.
While Antonioni and Cardillo’s framework captures the behavior of the oscillating
neurons as they work to synchronize and the tension inherent to such a system, it is
not set up to answer evolutionary questions. The fixed descriptions of the payoff pa-
rameters [15, 16], which are restricted to the type of Prisoner’s Dilemma games, do
not allow for the study of the explicit payoff conditions under which synchronization is
most likely to occur. As the payoff is determined by numerical solutions to Kuramoto
systems, it is intractable to derive closed-form conditions for natural selection to favor
synchronization across a wide variety of scenarios.
To address this issue, we allow the payoff parameters a range of possible values,
subject to a few biologically plausible assumptions (see details in Sec. 2). This allows
us to work backwards and discover what values of the payoff parameters cause the
system to evolve into a state of synchronization, which in turn allows us to make infer-
ences about the biology of the mammalian SCN. Additionally, while the framework of
[15] allows for the synchronization process to occur separately from the evolutionary
dynamics of the neurons’ strategies, the computational cost of accurately solving Ku-
ramoto systems over long time frames is high for large populations of oscillators. In
light of this, we consider intrinsic phases of neurons and their communicative strate-
gies as combined traits that jointly determine their payoffs and are subject to natural
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selection. This novel setup leads to co-evolutionary dynamics of communicative strate-
gies and multiple discrete phases of neurons, thereby providing a framework for a new
model of coupled oscillatory systems that allows us to study the impact of the evo-
lutionary constraint on the population of oscillators. Consequently, we will be able
to determine what evolutionary constraints allow organisms develop this synchronized
oscillatory behavior.
In this paper, we study the simplest case where oscillators either communicate with
all other oscillators or none. We define a game between neurons, also inspired by the
Prisoner’s Dilemma [17], in which each neuron receives a payoff based on their current
level of synchrony with their neighboring neurons and whether or not they choose to
communicate to improve the synchrony of the region. Using standard techniques from
evolutionary games in finite populations [18, 19, 20, 21], we are able to determine
when communication is a favorable strategy for the population. We find that, under a
variety of assumptions, this choice to communicate – and thus synchronize – is favored
when the benefit received by two synchronized, communicating neurons exceeds twice
the neuron’s incurred cost of communication.
2. Model
We consider a population of n neurons, thought of as oscillating agents. We con-
struct the biologically-motivated game under the following assumptions:
• neurons benefit by being in synchronization with their neighbors: the closer to
synchronization, the greater the benefit;
• to influence one another, neurons must communicate with their neighbors, which
incurs a cost.
Each neuron’s strategy consists of the pair of their communicative state, a ‘C’ if they
communicate with their neighbors or an ‘N ’ if not, and their phase φj = j 2pid , where φ1
through φd are distributed on the circle. The payoff of a neuron in any particular round
of the game depends on its communicative state, the communicative state of its partner,
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and the cyclic difference in their phases, denoted ∆φ1. Thus, the payoff matrix, which
describes pairwise interactions between neurons, takes on one of three possible forms,
depending on their communicative strategies and phases:
(I) (C, φj) (C, φk)
(C, φj) B(0)− c B(∆φ)− c
(C, φk) B(∆φ)− c B(0)− c
, (1)
(II) (C, φj) (N,φk)
(C, φj) B(0)− c β(∆φ)− c
(N,φk) β(∆φ) 0
, (2)
(III) (N,φj) (N,φk)
(N,φj) 0 0
(N,φk) 0 0
(3)
Here, c represents the cost of communication, while B(∆φ) is the benefit received by
a communicative neuron playing against another communicative neuron and β(∆φ)
is the benefit received by each neuron when only one is communicative. To incorpo-
rate the above assumptions, we take both B and β to be decreasing functions of ∆φ
and assume that the benefit of bilateral communication B(∆φ) is greater than that of
unilateral communication β(∆φ), namely, B(∆φ) > β(∆φ) for all ∆φ.
While the payoff matrices above allow for pairwise comparisons of the relative
strengths of various strategies, other quantities allow for more overarching compar-
isons. The expected payoff of a strategy E, denoted by piE , calculates the average
payoff received by strategy E given the current frequency of each strategy among its
neighbors. The fitness of a neuron with strategy E is given by fE = eδpiE , where the
parameter δ is the strength of selection [21]. The fitness of a neuron’s strategy is used
to weigh the neuron’s ability to reproduce in the evolution of the population, thereby
mimicking the effect of natural selection on advantageous traits in biological evolution.
1If one neuron has phase φj and another neuron has phase φk , ∆φ = |φj − φk| if |φj − φk| ≤ pi,
otherwise ∆φ = 2pi − |φj − φk|.
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The evolution of the system is governed by the Moran process: at each time step,
we choose a neuron uniformly at random to delete, and one neuron is chosen with prob-
ability proportional to its selective fitness to reproduce, thereby replacing the deleted
neuron with a new neuron of its own strategy [13]. To better mimic biological evolu-
tion, we allow the strategy of a new neuron the chance to mutate during each repro-
duction step, meaning that with a small probability µ, the new neuron will be assigned
a random strategy rather than faithfully inherit the strategy of its parent. The strength
of selection, δ, determines the extent to which the structure of the game impacts the
evolutionary success of each strategy: large values of δ give more weight to the role of
payoff in fitness, while a selection strength of δ = 0 gives all individuals the baseline
fitness value of 1. The latter process is called neutral drift [13], since the game plays
no role in an individual’s reproductive success. Thus, any neuron with a strategy with
a higher average payoff and thus a higher fitness will be more likely to reproduce at
each time step in the evolutionary process. Over time, we expect strategies with higher
fitness values to increase in number in the population. Eventually, the Moran process
will reach equilibrium in a state where all neurons share the same strategy [13]. Once
reaching such an equilibrium point, the state of the system will remain unchanged,
unless a mutation event occurs.
Synchronization will usually2 only occur when all neurons have a (C, ?) strategy:
regardless of the assumed underlying network topology, any neuron with an (N, ?)
strategy is effectively unconnected, as it does not take advantage of its links to neigh-
boring nodes for communication – and thus synchronization – purposes. Thus, in our
effort to determine conditions under which the system will synchronize, we look for
those conditions under which (C, ?) strategies are selectively favored. In this work, we
assume the simplest possible underlying network topology (the so-called well-mixed
populations [18]): all neurons are equally likely to interact with all other neurons in the
population.
There are two standard simplifying assumptions in the evolutionary game theory
2The one highly unlikely exception is the case where all neurons have the strategy (N,φj) for some
phase φj .
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literature: weak selection (when δ  1n ) [18, 22] and low mutation (when µ 
1
n ) [20, 23]. In the results below, we explore the conditions under which commu-
nicative strategies are favored under various combinations of these two standard as-
sumptions. Mathematically, problems are usually most theoretically tractable when
both weak selection and low mutation assumptions are made, and thus we began with
this case in Section 3.1 for pairwise invasion dynamics in the limit of weak selection,
followed by the case where we assume instead that selection is strong in Section 3.2.
While more difficult for studying evolutionary dynamics of multiple types, weakening
only one of these assumptions can also often lead to tractable problems, as explored in
Section (3.3) for the low mutation limit and Section (3.4) for the weak selection limit.
Abandoning both often makes it quite difficult to obtain theoretical results, and thus we
reserve such explorations for future work.
3. Results
To derive analytical approximation results, we consider this framework under var-
ious scenarios: (1) pairwise invasion dynamics where the population essentially con-
sists of at most two different types of neurons at a time for both weak selection and
strong selection limits, (2) evolutionary dynamics of multiple 2d types of neurons for
any selection and low mutation, as well as for weak selection and any mutation. In
each scenario, we are able to apply existing evolutionary game theoretic techniques to
explore conditions under which communicative strategies are favored.
3.1. Pairwise invasion dynamics: weak selection limit
Under the assumptions of weak selection δ  1/n, we show that communicative
strategies benefit from selective pressure, meaning the fixation probability of a single
communicative neuron ρC exceeds the neutral fixation probability 1/n, when B(0) +
β(∆φ) > 3c, and that they are favored over non–communicative strategies, that is,
ρC > ρN , when B(0) > 2c.
Assuming pairwise invasion dynamics means that if we start from a uniform–
strategy state, only one mutation event occurs before the chain is re–absorbed into
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Figure 1: Classical game regimes for different values of B(0) and β(∆φ) under the assumption of weak
selection and low mutation. Also marked are regions where E = (C, φj) has a selective advantage, either
over a neutral strategy (heavy line) or over the strategy F = (N,φk) (dotted line).
either its original uniform–strategy state or a state where the newly–mutated strategy
is now universal. Thus, at most two strategies, E and F , exist in the population at
any given time. In this section, we will focus on the case where the two strategies
present are (C, φj) and (N,φk) and ignore the cases where the two strategies exist-
ing in the population are (C, φj) and (C, φk) or (N,φj) and (N,φk). In these latter
two cases, not only are the dynamics well understood (when both strategies present in
the population are communicative, payoff matrix (I) above shows that the dynamics
are driven by a simple coordination game, while payoff matrix (III) shows that in the
non–communicative case, dynamics will be drive by the neutral process), but without a
mix of (C, ?) and (N, ?) strategies, it is not possible to compare the relative success of
communication and non–communication, which is the main goal of this work. Thus, in
this section, we will restrict our study to the case whereE = (C, φj) and F = (N,φk).
In this setting, we can characterize the game being played in terms of classical games
– prisoner’s dilemma, snowdrift game, cooperation, mutualism – via the payoff ma-
trix (II) above [13]. Figure (1) shows which of these classical games arise in various
parameter regimes.
In any population with only two strategies, we model the Moran process as a
Markov chain with transition matrix p on state space {0, 1, . . . , n − 1, n}, where the
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chain is in state i if there are i individuals with strategy E in the population. The
transition matrix p is a tri–diagonal stochastic matrix where3
p0,0 = 1, (4)
pn,n = 1, (5)
pi,i−1 =
i
n
· (n− i)fF (i)
ifE(i) + (n− i)fF (i) , (6)
pi,i+1 =
n− i
n
· ifE(i)
ifE(i) + (n− i)fF (i) , and (7)
pi,i = 1− pi,i−1 − pi,i+1. (8)
From this, we derive the fixation probability, which allows us to determine the
relative evolutionary success of various strategies. The fixation probability of strategy
E = (C, φj), denoted ρE , is the probability that, in a population with one strategy–E
individual and n − 1 individuals with strategy F = (N,φk), the process is absorbed
into the state where all individuals have strategy E [13]. Thus, we can quantify the
success of a strategy E in two ways:
1. Is E more likely to fixate in the population than a strategy would under the
neutral process, and
2. Is E more likely to fixate in the population than F , its competing strategy? [18]
To answer both questions, the key quantity turns out to be the ratio pi,i−1pi,i+1 , which we de-
note γi. This is perhaps not surprising: if γi is greater than 1, communicative strategies
should be favored, while non–communicative strategies should be favored otherwise.
We will see this quantity appear repeatedly in our various analyses under each set of
assumptions.
We first compute the expected payoffs for both strategy E and strategy F as a
function of the total number of strategy–E individuals in the population, i, by summing
3The low mutation assumption allows the transition probabilities below to ignore the possibility of a
transition arising by mutation. Since, beginning from a uniform–strategy state, only one mutation event
occurs before the chain is reabsorbed, there is no possibility that a mutation will arise during this transient
phase of the process.
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the product of each potential payoff by the frequency with which such a neuron would
receive that payoff. We get
piE(i) =
(
B(0)− c
)( i− 1
n− 1
)
+
(
β(∆φ)− c
)( n− i
n− 1
)
=
1
n− 1
(
i
(
B(0)− β(∆φ)
)
+ nβ(∆φ)−B(0)− (n− 1)c
)
, (9)
and
piF (i) =
(
β(∆φ)
)( i
n− 1
)
+
(
0
)(n− i− 1
n− 1
)
= β(∆φ)
(
i
n− 1
)
. (10)
Next, we compute the probability, xi, that the chain is absorbed into state n from
the state i. With this notation, we have ρE = x1 and ρF = 1− xn−1. We first observe
the following recurrence:
x0 = 0
xi = pi,i−1xi−1 + pi,ixi + pi,i+1xi+1 (11)
xn = 1.
If we let yi = xi − xi−1 for i = 1, . . . , n, we have that
n∑
i=1
yi = (x1 − x0) + (x2 − x1) + · · ·+ (xn − xn−1)
= xn − x0
= 1. (12)
Taking equation (11) with equation (8), we get
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pi,i−1(xi − xi−1) = pi,i+1(xi+1 − xi)
pi,i−1
pi,i+1
yi = yi+1
γiyi = yi+1. (13)
Here, we see the quantity γi appear for the first time. Now, since y1 = x1, we have
yi =
∏i−1
j=1 γjx1 for i ≥ 2. Substituting this into equation (12), we get
x1 +
n∑
i=2
i−1∏
j=1
γjx1 = 1
x1
(
1 +
n−1∑
i=1
( i∏
j=1
γj
))
= 1
x1 =
1
1 +
∑n−1
i=1
(∏i
j=1 γj
) . (14)
Moreover, xi =
∑i
j=1 yj = x1
(
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 γk
)
. So:
xi =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 γk
1 +
∑n−1
j=1
(∏j
k=1 γk
) . (15)
Thus, we get that
ρE = x1 =
1
1 +
∑n−1
j=1
(∏j
k=1 γk
) , (16)
and
ρF = 1− xn−1
= 1− 1 +
∑n−2
j=1
∏j
k=1 γk
1 +
∑n−1
j=1
(∏j
k=1 γk
)
=
∏n−1
k=1 γk
1 +
∑n−1
j=1
(∏j
k=1 γk
)
= ρE
n−1∏
k=1
γk. (17)
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To apply the general formulas (16) and (17) to our set-up, we first compute γk with
the appropriate values from payoff matrix (II):
γk =
pk,k−1
pk,k+1
=
k
n · (n−k)fF (k)kfE(k)+(n−k)fF (k)
n−k
n · kfE(k)kfE(k)+(n−k)fF (k)
=
fF (k)
fE(k)
=
eδpiF (k)
eδpiE(k)
= eδ
(
piF (k)−piE(k)
)
= e
δ
(
β(∆φ)
(
k
n−1
)
− 1n−1
(
k
(
B(0)−β(∆φ)
)
+nβ(∆φ)−B(0)−(n−1)c
))
= e
δ
n−1
((
2β(∆φ)−B(0)
)
k+B(0)−nβ(∆φ)+(n−1)c
)
. (18)
Thus, equations (16) – (18) give us
ρE =
(
1 +
n−1∑
j=1
j∏
k=1
e
δ
n−1
((
2β(∆φ)−B(0)
)
k+B(0)−nβ(∆φ)+(n−1)c
))−1
=
(
1 +
n−1∑
j=1
e
δ
n−1
∑j
k=1
(
2β(∆φ)−B(0)
)
k+B(0)−nβ(∆φ)+(n−1)c
))−1
=
(
1 +
n−1∑
j=1
e
δ
n−1
(
j2
(
β(∆φ)− 12B(0)
)
+j
(
1
2B(0)−(n−1)β(∆φ)+(n−1)c
)))−1
, (19)
and
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ρF = ρE
n−1∏
k=1
e
δ
n−1
((
2β(∆φ)−B(0)
)
k+B(0)−nβ(∆φ)+(n−1)c
)
= ρE
(
e
δ
n−1
∑n−1
k=1
((
2β(∆φ)−B(0)
)
k+B(0)−nβ(∆φ)+(n−1)c
))
= ρE
(
e
δ
n−1
((
2β(∆φ)−B(0)
)
(n−1)n
2 +(n−1)
(
B(0)−nβ(∆φ)+(n−1)c
)))
= ρE
(
eδ
(
(n−1)c−n−22 B(0)
))
. (20)
We are now prepared to answer the two questions posed above. For question 1, we
first calculate the fixation probability for a strategy under the neutral process, i.e. when
δ = 0. Using equation (18) with δ = 0 yields γk = 1 regardless of the particular game
theoretic framework. From equation (16), we then see that the fixation probability of
any strategy under the neutral process is 1n . Thus, to determine whether the selective
pressure on strategy E = (C, φj) increases the overall evolutionary success of the
strategy, we compare equation (19) to 1n . Here, we take advantage of our assumption
of weak selection (δ << 1n ) and use a first order Taylor expansion in δ to approximate
γk (see equation (18)):
γk ≈ 1 + δ
(
piF (k)− piE(k)
)
= 1 +
δ
n− 1
((
2β(∆φ)−B(0))k +B(0)− nβ(∆φ) + (n− 1)c) (21)
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Substituting this expression into equation (16) allows us to approximate ρE as follows:
ρE ≈
(
1 +
n−1∑
j=1
(
j∏
k=1
(
1 +
δ
n− 1
((
2β(∆φ)−B(0))k +B(0)− nβ(∆φ) + (n− 1)c))))−1
≈
(
1 +
n−1∑
j=1
(
1 +
δ
n− 1
j∑
k=1
((
2β(∆φ)−B(0))k +B(0)− nβ(∆φ) + (n− 1)c)))−1
=
(
1 +
n−1∑
j=1
(
1 +
δ
n− 1
((
2β(∆φ)−B(0)) j(j + 1)
2
+ j
(
B(0)− nβ(∆φ) + (n− 1)c))))−1
=
(
1 +
n−1∑
j=1
(
1 +
δ
n− 1
(
j2
(
β(∆φ)− B(0)
2
)
+ j
(B(0)
2
− (n− 1)β(∆φ) + (n− 1)c)
))))−1
=
(
n+
δ
n− 1
((
β(∆φ)− 1
2
B(0)
) (n− 1)n(2n− 1)
6
+
(1
2
B(0)− (n− 1)β(∆φ) + (n− 1)c
) (n− 1)n
2
))−1
=
(
n
(
1 + δ
((
β(∆φ)− 1
2
B(0)
)2n− 1
6
+
(1
2
B(0)− (n− 1)β(∆φ) + (n− 1)c
)1
2
)))−1
=
1
n
(
1− δ
6
((
B(0) + β(∆φ)− 3c
)
n−
(
2B(0) + 2β(∆φ)− 3c
)))−1
(22)
Letting α = B(0) + β(∆φ)− 3c and λ = 2B(0) + 2β(∆φ)− 3c, we have
ρE ≈ 1
n
· 1
1− δ6
(
αn− λ) . (23)
Thus, ρE will exceed 1n if and only if αn > λ, or rather
n
(
B(0) + β(∆φ)− 3c) > 2B(0) + 2β(∆φ)− 3c
(n− 2)B(0) + (n− 2)β(∆φ) > 3c(n− 1). (24)
For sufficiently large populations, we then get the following simpler condition that
specifies exactly when strategyE has greater evolutionary success than a strategy under
the neutral process:
B(0) + β(∆φ) > 3c. (25)
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We now turn our attention to question (2): is strategy E = (C, φj) more likely to
fixate in the population than strategy F = (N,φk)? To examine this, we look at the
ratio of ρF to ρE , using equation (20):
ρF
ρE
=
ρE
(
eδ
(
(n−1)c−n−22 B(0)
))
ρE
= eδ
(
(n−1)c−n−22 B(0)
)
. (26)
Thus, ρE > ρF if and only if
(n− 1)c < n− 2
2
B(0). (27)
Again, for sufficiently large populations, we get the simpler condition
B(0) > 2c. (28)
In Section 3.3 below, we will prove that this condition holds even under slightly weaker
conditions.
3.2. Pairwise invasion dynamics: strong selection limit
Under the assumptions of strong selection, we show that communicative strategies
are always favored over non–communicative strategies in pairwise invasion dynamics
when c < β(∆φ) < B(0)− c.
If we instead assume that selection is strong (δ >> 1), there is no longer a use-
ful way to estimate a strategy’s fixation probability, so we take a different approach.
We instead consider the critical ratio γ−1i =
pi,i+1
pi,i−1
directly, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1.
As mentioned in Section 3.1 above, for a given i, this ratio provides an indication of
whether the number of strategy–E individuals is more likely to increase or decrease: if
γ−1i < 1, the population is more like to lose a strategy–E individual, while if γ
−1
i > 1,
the population is more likely to gain a strategy–E individual. Recall from equation
(18) that
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γ−1i =
pi,i+1
pi,i−1
(29)
=
(
eδ(piF (i)−piE(i))
)−1
= eδ(piE(i)−piF (i)).
Thus, in the limit of strong selection (i.e. as δ → ∞), γ−1i approaches either ∞, if
piE(i) − piF (i) > 0, or 0, if piE(i) − piF (i) < 0. Therefore, under the assumption
of strong selection the process becomes essentially deterministic: whether or not the
process moves to a state with a higher or lower number of strategy–E individuals is
determined by the sign of piE(i) − piF (i). Furthermore, piE(i) − piF (i), which we’ll
denote as ∆pi(i), is a linear function of i:
∆pi(i) = piE(i)− piF (i)
=
(
1
n− 1
(
i
(
B(0)− β(∆φ))+ nβ(∆φ)−B(0)− (n− 1)c))−(β(∆φ)( i
n− 1
))
=
1
n− 1
(
(B(0)− 2β(∆φ))i+ (nβ(∆φ)−B(0)− (n− 1)c)
)
. (30)
We can characterize the dynamics of the system simply by considering this difference
at the end points, where i = 1 and i = n− 1:
∆pi(1) =
1
n− 1
(
β(∆φ)(n− 2)− c(n− 1)
)
,
∆pi(n− 1) = 1
n− 1
(
B(0)(n− 2)− β(∆φ)(n− 2)− c(n− 1)
)
. (31)
Thus, when there are few communicative strategy individuals in the population, com-
munication is favored when
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∆pi(1) > 0
1
n− 1
(
β(∆φ)(n− 2)− c(n− 1)
)
> 0
β(∆φ)(n− 2) > c(n− 1)
β(∆φ) >
c(n− 1)
n− 2 . (32)
In a sufficiently large population, equation (32) implies that communication is favored
when
β(∆φ) > c, (33)
which is depicted in Figure (2) as the region above line L(1).
When there are few non–communicative strategy individuals in the population,
communication is favored when
∆pi(n− 1) > 0
1
n− 1
(
B(0)(n− 2)− β(∆φ)(n− 2)− c(n− 1)
)
> 0
β(∆φ)(n− 2) < B(0)(n− 2)− c(n− 1)
β(∆φ) < B(0)− c(n− 1)
n− 2 . (34)
Again, when the population is sufficiently large, this implies that communication is
favored if and only if
β(∆φ) < B(0)− c, (35)
which is represented by the region below line L(2) in Figure (2). Together, conditions
(33) and (35) divide the parameter space into regions where the dynamics differ, as
seen in Figure (2).
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Figure 2: Game regimes for different values ofB(0) and β(∆φ) in the case of strong selection. Above lines
L(1) and L(2), strategy F is favored when there are more strategy–E individuals, and strategy E is favored
when there are more strategy–F individuals. Below L(2) and above L(1), strategy E is always favored,
while strategy F is always favored in the region below L(1) and above L(2). Finally, below both lines,
strategy E is favored when there are more strategy–E individuals, and strategy F is favored when there are
more strategy–F individuals in the population.
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3.3. Evolutionary dynamics of multiple types: any selection strength and low mutation
limit.
We prove that under the assumption of low mutation, (C, ?) strategies are favored
by the selection process if and only if B(0) > 2c. More specifically, we will show
that the frequency of (C, ?) strategies is higher than that of the (N, ?) strategies at
stationarity if and only if B(0) > 2c.
Suppose we have d phases, φ1, φ2, . . . , φd with φj = j 2pid , evenly distributed on
the cycle. We thus have 2d strategies: (C, φ1), (C, φ2), . . . , (C, φd), (N,φ1), (N,φ2),
. . . , and (N,φd). As described above, if the mutation rate is sufficiently low, we as-
sume that in any uniform–strategy population, only one mutation will occur before
the chain is reabsorbed and thus that no more than two of these 2d total strategies
ever exist in the population at any one time. Therefore, we can compress the Moran
process described in Section 3.1 above into a new Markov chain that transitions be-
tween uniform–strategy states. This new chain has the set of possible strategies as its
state space, and the probability of transitioning from, say, the uniform strategy–F state
to the uniform strategy–E state is given by the probability that a single strategy–E
individual (arising by mutation) can overtake a population of all strategy–F individu-
als [24]. Thus, this transition probability is exactly the fixation probability, ρE , from
equation (19). Here, we will consider this new Markov chain on the uniform–strategy
states {(C, φ1), (C, φ2), . . . , (C, φd), (N,φ1), (N,φ2), . . . , (N,φd)}, where the tran-
sition probabilities are given by the corresponding fixation probabilities. The transition
matrix, M , for this chain has a block structure
M =
 B1 B2
B3 B4
 , (36)
whereB1, B2, B3, andB4 are d-by-d blocks describing transitions between two (C, ?)
strategies, transitions from a (C, ?) strategy to an (N, ?) strategy, transitions from an
(N, ?) strategy to a (C, ?) strategy, and transitions between (N, ?) strategies, respec-
tively. Diagonal elements in blocks B1 and B4 are assigned the values necessary to
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make M row–stochastic4. Within each block, all fixation probabilities follow the same
form. As we saw in equation (16), these fixation probabilities depend only on the pay-
off values and the quantity ∆φ. Since the payoff values – up to their own dependence
on ∆φ – are constant within each block, the transition probabilities within a single
block differ only by their dependence on ∆φ. Thus, to simplify notation and empha-
size the important quantity ∆φ, we will write ρCN,∆φ to denote the fixation probability
for a strategy (N,φj) invading a population of (C, φk) strategy individuals.
These expressions are easily calculated using equation (16) and the payoff ma-
trix associated to each block. For blocks B2 and B3, these fixation probabilities were
previously calculated in Section 3.1 and can be found in equations (20) and (19), re-
spectively. For block B1, substituting values from payoff matrix (I) into equation (16)
yields the expression
ρCC,∆φ =
(
1 +
n−1∑
k=1
e
δ
n−1
(
k(k+1)
2 (2B(∆φ)−2B(0))+k(B(0)n−B(∆φ)n)
))−1
. (37)
Finally, for block B4, substituting values from payoff matrix (III) into equation (16)
yields the constant value 1n . Given that all differences between transition probabili-
ties in a single block are driven by ∆φ, these blocks exhibit many symmetries. For
example, when d is odd, we get that B1 is given by
4Strictly speaking, entries in the transition matrix M are of the form µρ ,∆φ. Thus, by re–scaling the
mutation probability µ, we can ensure that diagonal entries of M are, in fact, positive. Note that the factor µ
has no bearing on the stationary distribution of M , and can thus be ignored [20].
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B1 =

† ρCC,1 ρCC,2 . . . ρCC,b d2 c ρCC,b d2 c ρCC,b d2 c−1 . . . ρCC,1
ρCC,1 † ρCC,1 . . . ρCC,b d2 c−1 ρCC,b d2 c ρCC,b d2 c . . . ρCC,2
ρCC,2 ρCC,1 † . . . ρCC,b d2 c−2 ρCC,b d2 c−1 ρCC,b d2 c . . . ρCC,3
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
ρCC,b d2 c−1 ρCC,b d2 c−2 ρCC,b d2 c−3 . . . † ρCC,1 ρCC,2 . . . ρCC,b d2 c
ρCC,b d2 c ρCC,b d2 c−1 ρCC,b d2 c−2 . . . ρCC,1 † ρCC,1 . . . ρCC,b d2 c
ρCC,b d2 c ρCC,b d2 c ρCC,b d2 c−1 . . . ρCC,2 ρCC,1 † . . . ρCC,b d2 c−1
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
ρCC,1 ρCC,2 ρCC,3 . . . ρCC,b d2 c ρCC,b d2 c−1 ρCC,b d2 c−2 . . . †

,
(38)
where † stands in for the values needed to ensure row–stochasticity of M . When d is
even,B1 has the same general pattern, with the exception that, in each row and column,
ρ ,b d2 c is repeated only once.
This same pattern repeats itself in blocks B2 and B3, where ρCC,∆φ is replaced
with ρCN,∆φ in B2 and ρNC,∆φ in B3. Furthermore, the diagonal values are re-
placed with ρCN,0 and ρNC,0 in blocks B2 and B3, respectively. Note that ρCN,∆φ
and ρNC,∆φ are not equal quantities, and M is not a symmetric matrix.
However, the blocks B1, B2, B3, and B4 are each symmetric matrices. Within
each of these blocks, each row (and thus each column) contains the same set of (non-
diagonal) values, so all rows (and thus all columns) within a single block – and thus for
the matrix as a whole – have the same sum, which implies that the diagonal elements
of B1 (the † values) are all equal, as are the diagonal values in B4.
The symmetries present in M allow us to show that the stationary distribution as-
sociated to this Markov chain has the form
s = [s1, s1, . . . , s1︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
, s2, s2, . . . , s2︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
]. (39)
In fact, we will prove that for s1 =
∑2d
r=d+1Mrq
d
∑2d
r=d+1(Mqr+Mrq)
, s2 =
∑2d
r=d+1Mqr
d
∑2d
r=d+1(Mqr+Mrq)
,
and 1 ≤ q ≤ d, s is the stationary distribution for M . While both s1 and s2 appear as
if to vary with q, the symmetries of M imply s1 and s2 are the same for 1 ≤ q ≤ d.
To see this, note that when 1 ≤ q ≤ d,∑2dr=d+1Mrq sums over a column of block B3.
Since all columns of B3 contain the same set of values, choosing a different column
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does not change the sum. Similarly, when 1 ≤ q ≤ d, ∑2dr=d+1Mqr is summing over
a row in block B1, in which all rows contain the same set of values. Thus, any choice
of q such that 1 ≤ q ≤ d will yield the same values for s1 and s2. Furthermore, s1 and
s2 have the following relationship:
s1
2d∑
r=d+1
Mqr = s2
2d∑
r=d+1
Mrq. (40)
To prove that s is indeed the stationary distribution forM , we will show that sM =
s. First, for 1 ≤ u ≤ d, we have:
(sM)u =
2d∑
v=1
svMvu (41)
=
d∑
v=1
s1Mvu +
2d∑
v=d+1
s2Mvu. (42)
Since B1 is symmetric, we can switch the indices of M in the first sum. Furthermore,
we can use the relationship between s1 and s2 in equation (40) to substitute for the
second sum:
(sM)u = s1
d∑
v=1
Muv + s1
2d∑
v=d+1
Muv (43)
= s1
2d∑
v=1
Muv (44)
= s1, (45)
where the final equality follows from the row stochasticity of M . Thus, we’ve shown
that the first d elements of (sM) are indeed s1. A similar argument shows that the final
d elements are, in fact, s2. If d+ 1 ≤ u ≤ 2d, we have:
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(sM)u =
2d∑
v=1
svMvu
=
d∑
v=1
s1Mvu +
2d∑
v=d+1
s2Mvu
= s1
d∑
v=1
Mu−d,v+d + s2
2d∑
v=d+1
Muv
= s1
2d∑
v=d+1
Mu−d,v + s2
2d∑
v=d+1
Muv, (46)
where the second–to–last equality follows from the symmetry of blocks B2 and B4.
Applying equation (40) and noting the symmetry of B3, we get
(sM)u = s2
2d∑
v=d+1
Mv,u−d + s2
2d∑
v=d+1
Muv
= s2
2d∑
v=d+1
Mu,v−d + s2
2d∑
v=d+1
Muv
= s2
d∑
v=1
Muv + s2
2d∑
v=d+1
Muv
= s2
2d∑
v=1
Muv
= s2. (47)
Thus, sM = s. Since
∑2d
v=1 sv = 1, s is the stationary distribution for M .
With this stationary distribution in hand, we can compare frequencies of (C, ?) and
(N, ?) strategies. First, though, note that the ratio given by equation (26),
ρCN,∆φqr
ρNC,∆φqr
= eδ
(
n−2
2 B(0)−(n−1)c
)
, (48)
where ∆φqr is the cyclic difference between phases φq and φr, is constant for all possi-
ble pairs (q, r). Thus, if we let ω =
eδ
(
n−2
2 B(0)−(n−1)c
)
, we have ρNC,∆φqr = ωρCN,∆φqr for any (q, r).
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At stationarity, (C, ?) strategies occur with frequency ds1, while (N, ?) strategies
occur with frequency ds2. To compare, we look at the ratio:
d · s1
d · s2 =
s1
s2
=
2d∑
r=d+1
Mrq
2d∑
r=d+1
Mqr
. (49)
Recalling that 1 ≤ q ≤ d, we have
d · s1
d · s2 =
d∑
r=1
ρNC,∆φqr
d∑
r=1
ρCN,∆φqr
. (50)
Substituting for ρNC,∆φqr yields
d · s1
d · s2 =
d∑
r=1
ωρCN,∆φqr
d∑
r=1
ρCN,∆φqr
=
ω
d∑
r=1
ρCN,∆φqr
d∑
r=1
ρCN,∆φqr
= ω
= eδ
(
n−2
2 B(0)−(n−1)c
)
. (51)
Thus, for communicative strategies to be more prevalent at stationarity, we need
eδ
(
n−2
2 B(0)−(n−1)c
)
> 1, (52)
which occurs exactly when
n− 2
2
B(0)− (n− 1)c > 0, (53)
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or rather when
B(0) >
2c(n− 1)
n− 2 . (54)
For sufficiently large populations, it suffices to have B(0) > 2c.
3.4. Evolutionary dynamics of multiple types: weak selection limit and any mutation
rate.
Under only the assumption of weak selection, we show that communicative strate-
gies are favored over non–communicative strategies at any mutation rate when
B(0) + µn
((
〈B(∆φl·)〉 − 1
2
〈B(∆φ··)〉
)
+
(
〈β(∆φl·)〉 − 〈β(∆φ··)〉
)
− c
)
> 2c,
where 〈B(∆φl·)〉, for example, denotes the average of B(∆φlq) over all possible
phases φq .
Without assuming low mutation, the population may consist of more than two
strategies at any given time. However, following the framework in [22], we study our
multiple–strategy population under the assumption that the selective pressure is suffi-
ciently weak (i.e. δ << 1n ). In that paper, Antal et al. identify a strategy’s evolutionary
success with its average frequency in the long–time average. Under the assumption
of weak selection, all strategies have an approximately equal average frequency ( 1m ,
where m is the number of strategies) in the stationary distribution of the evolution-
ary process. Thus, a strategy is considered to be favored by selection if its long–time
average frequency exceeds 1m . To make this more precise, suppose that our size n pop-
ulation contains m strategies, and let A = (aqr) be the m–by–m payoff matrix, where
aqr is the payoff received by a strategy–q player when playing a strategy–r player.
Once again, the evolutionary dynamics are given by the frequency–dependent Moran
process, where a node’s likelihood of reproduction is proportional to its frequency. The
new node inherits its parent’s strategy with probability 1 − µ; with probability µ, the
node receives a random, newly–mutated strategy. Antal et al. state that strategy l is
favored by selection when
Ll + µnHl > 0, (55)
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where Ll and Hl (given below) are expressions that characterize the favorability of
strategy l when the mutation rate is low and high, respectively. The factor of µn in
front of Hl allows the mutation rate to determine the relative importance of the low
and high mutation terms.
In [22], then, if mutation is low (µ << 1n ), strategy l is selectively advantaged
when
Ll =
1
m
m∑
q=1
(all + alq − aql − aqq) > 0. (56)
For intuition, note that, when the mutation rate is low and only two strategies, say l and
q, exist in the population, strategy l is favored over strategy q when all + alq − aql −
aqq > 0 [13], which is consistent with condition (28) as derived in Section 3.1. Thus,
here in this multi–strategy case, condition (56) states that strategy l has a selective
advantage when the average of these critical values for each other strategy exceeds 0.
Conversely, if the mutation rate is high, Antal et al. say strategy l is favored when
Hl =
1
m2
m∑
q,r=1
(alr − aqr) > 0. (57)
This condition is obtained by comparing the fitness of strategy l to the average fitness of
the population. Given our assumption that in the case of weak selection, all strategies
have an approximately equal average frequency of 1m , the expected payoff for strategy
l is approximately 1m
∑m
r=1 alr. Thus, strategy l has an approximate fitness of 1 +
δ
m
∑m
r=1 alr.
5 Similarly, the average fitness for any strategy can then be expressed as
1
m
∑m
q=1
(
1 + δm
∑m
r=1 aqr
)
. Comparing these two expressions, we get the following:
5Here, we approximate the fitness of strategy l with its first–order Taylor approximation, as in equation
(21).
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(
1 +
δ
m
m∑
r=1
alr
)
−
(
1
m
m∑
q=1
(
1 +
δ
m
m∑
r=1
aqr
))
= 1 +
δ
m
m∑
r=1
alr − 1− δ
m2
m∑
q,r=1
aqr
= δ
[
1
m
m∑
r=1
alr − 1
m2
m∑
q,r=1
aqr
]
= δ
[
1
m2
m∑
q,r=1
alr − 1
m2
m∑
q,r=1
aqr
]
=
δ
m2
m∑
q,r=1
(alr − aqr), (58)
which leads directly to condition (57). Substituting conditions (56) and (57) into the
general condition (55) yields
Ll + µnHl =
1
m
m∑
q=1
(all + alq − aql − aqq) + µn
m2
m∑
q,r=1
(alr − aqr) > 0, (59)
a single condition that is able to capture the favorability of strategy l for any mutation
rate.
In our framework, we have d distinct possible phases, φj = j 2pid , arranged symmet-
rically on the circle, and so there arem = 2d overall strategies: {(C, φ1), (C, φ2), . . . , (C, φd), (N,φ1),
. . . , (N,φd)}. Thus, we have a 2d-by-2d payoff matrix, A = (aqr), given by
A =

B(0)− c B(∆φ1,2)− c . . . B(∆φ1,d)− c β(0)− c β(∆φ1,2)− c . . . β(∆φ1,d)− c
B(∆φ1,2)− c B(0)− c . . . B(∆φ2,d)− c β(∆φ1,2)− c β(0)− c . . . β(∆φ2,d)− c
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
B(∆φ1,d)− c B(∆φ2,d)− c . . . B(0)− c β(∆φ1,d)− c β(∆φ2,d)− c . . . β(0)− c
β(0) β(∆φ1,2) . . . β(∆φ1,d) 0 0 . . . 0
β(∆φ1,2) β(0) . . . β(∆φ2,d) 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
β(∆φ1,d) β(∆φ2,d) . . . β(0) 0 0 . . . 0

.
(60)
Note that ∆φqr −∆φrq.
We first use conditions (56), (57), and (59) to examine the relative success of
(C, ?) strategies in this new framework. Let l denote a (C, ?) strategy. As we have
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arranged the strategies so that the first d are communicative and the last d are non–
communicative, we can split the sums in equations (56) and (57) and substitute the
appropriate payoffs in each case. Beginning with the low mutation case, we get
Ll =
1
2d
[
d∑
q=1
(all + alq − aql − aqq) +
2d∑
q=d+1
(all + alq − aql − aqq)
]
=
1
2d
[
d∑
q=1
(
(B(0)− c) + (B(∆φql)− c)− (B(∆φql)− c)− (B(0)− c)
)
+
2d∑
q=d+1
(
(B(0)− c) + (β(∆φq−d,l)− c)− (β(∆φq−d,l))− (0)
)]
=
1
2d
[
2d∑
q=d+1
(
B(0)− 2c
)]
=
1
2
(
B(0)− 2c
)
=
1
2
B(0)− c. (61)
Thus, when the mutation rate is low, a communicative strategy l is preferred when
B(0) > 2c, confirming our results in Sections 3.1 and 3.3.
Similarly, when the mutation rate is high, we apply the same strategy to condition
(57):
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Hl =
1
4d2
[
d∑
q=1
d∑
r=1
(alr − aqr) +
d∑
q=1
2d∑
r=d+1
(alr − aqr) +
2d∑
q=d+1
d∑
r=1
(alr − aqr) +
2d∑
q=d+1
2d∑
r=d+1
(alr − aqr)
]
=
1
4d2
[
d∑
q=1
d∑
r=1
(
(B(∆φlr)− c)− (B(∆φqr)− c)
)
+
d∑
q=1
2d∑
r=d+1
(
(β(∆φl,r−d)− c)− (β(∆φq,r−d)− c)
)
+
2d∑
q=d+1
d∑
r=1
(
(B(∆φlr)− c)− (β(∆φq−d,r))
)
+
2d∑
q=d+1
2d∑
r=d+1
(
(β(∆φl,r−d)− c)− (0)
)]
=
1
4d2
[
− 2d2c+
d∑
q=1
d∑
r=1
(B(∆φlr)−B(∆φqr)) +
d∑
q=1
2d∑
r=d+1
(β(∆φl,r−d)− β(∆φq,r−d))
+
2d∑
q=d+1
d∑
r=1
(B(∆φlr)− β(∆φq−d,r)) +
2d∑
q=d+1
2d∑
r=d+1
(β(∆φl,r−d))
]
.
=
−c
2
+
1
4d2
[
2d
d∑
r=1
B(∆φlr)−
d∑
q=1
d∑
r=1
B(∆φqr) + 2d
d∑
r=1
β(∆φlr)− 2
d∑
q=1
d∑
r=1
β(∆φqr)
]
=
−c
2
+
1
2d
d∑
r=1
B(∆φlr) +
1
2d
2d∑
r=d+1
β(∆φlr)−
1
2d2
d∑
q=1
2d∑
r=d+1
β(∆φqr)− 1
4d2
d∑
q=1
2d∑
r=d+1
B(∆φqr)
=
−c
2
+
1
2
〈B(∆φl·)〉+
1
2
〈β(∆φl·)〉 −
1
2
〈β(∆φ··)〉 − 1
4
〈B(∆φ··)〉
=
1
2
[(
〈B(∆φl·)〉 −
1
2
〈B(∆φ··)〉
)
+
(
〈β(∆φl·)〉 − 〈β(∆φ··)〉
)
− c
]
. (62)
Thus, when the mutation rate is high, a communicative strategy l is favored when
(
〈B(∆φl·)〉 − 1
2
〈B(∆φ··)〉
)
+
(
〈β(∆φl·)〉 − 〈β(∆φ··)〉
)
> c. (63)
Applying condition (59), we can conclude that a communicative strategy l is favored
for mutation rate µ if Ll + µnHl > 0, or rather,
B(0)+µn
((
〈B(∆φl·)〉−1
2
〈B(∆φ··)〉
)
+
(
〈β(∆φl·)〉−〈β(∆φ··)〉
)
−c
)
> 2c. (64)
We can derive similar conditions for when a non–communicative strategy l is fa-
vored, once again using conditions (56), (57), and (59). When the mutation rate is low,
we have
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Ll =
1
2d
[
d∑
q=1
(all + alq − aql − aqq) +
2d∑
q=d+1
(all + alq − aql − aqq)
]
=
1
2d
[
d∑
q=1
(
(0) + (β(∆φql))− (β(∆φql)− c)− (B(0)− c)
)
+
2d∑
q=d+1
(
(0) + (0)− (0)− (0)
)]
=
1
2
(
2c−B(0)
)
, (65)
which gives us the symmetric condition to our earlier results: a non–communicative
strategy l is preferred when B(0) < 2c.
When the mutation rate is high, we have
Hl =
1
4d2
[
d∑
q=1
d∑
r=1
(alr − aqr) +
d∑
q=1
2d∑
r=d+1
(alr − aqr) +
2d∑
q=d+1
d∑
r=1
(alr − aqr) +
2d∑
q=d+1
2d∑
r=d+1
(alr − aqr)
]
=
1
4d2
[
d∑
q=1
d∑
r=1
(
(β(∆φl−d,r))− (B(∆φqr)− c)
)
+
d∑
q=1
2d∑
r=d+1
(
(0)− (β(∆φq,r−d)− c)
)
+
2d∑
q=d+1
d∑
r=1
(
(β(∆φl−d,r))− (β(∆φq−d,r))
)
+
2d∑
q=d+1
2d∑
r=d+1
(
(0)− (0))]
=
c
2
+
1
4d2
[
2d
d∑
r=1
β(∆φl−d,r)−
d∑
q=1
d∑
r=1
B(∆φqr)− 2
d∑
q=1
d∑
r=1
β(∆φqr)
]
=
c
2
+
1
2
〈β(∆φl−d,·)〉 −
1
4
〈B(∆φ··)〉 − 1
2
〈β(∆φ··)〉
=
1
2
[
c+ 〈β(∆φl−d,·)〉 − 〈β(∆φ··)〉 −
1
2
〈B(∆φ··)〉
]
. (66)
Thus, when the mutation rate is high, a non–communicative strategy l is favored when
〈B(∆φ··)〉+ 2
(
〈β(∆φ··)〉 − 〈β(∆φl−d,·〉
)
< 2c. (67)
Finally, applying condition (55) allows us to conclude that a non–communicative strat-
egy l is favored without regard to mutation rate if Ll + µnHl > 0, or rather, if
B(0)− µn
(
c+ 〈β(∆φl−d,·)〉 − 〈β(∆φ··)〉 − 1
2
〈B(∆φ··)〉
)
< 2c. (68)
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4. Discussion
Our results describe various conditions under which the synchronization in the SCN
of various organisms (i.e. mammals, drosophila, etc. [25]) is favored. Of course, not
all organisms exhibit behavior that follows a circadian rhythm. For example, some
organisms that live in extreme environments (the absence of light, for example), are
going through extreme life stages (e.g. migration, reproduction), or are highly social
fail to exhibit circadian behavior [4, 26]. It is also the case that not all organisms
with circadian rhythms have a circadian system controlled by a “master clock” like
the mammalian SCN. For example, many fish are believed to have a more complex
circadian clock arrangement involving a network of interconnected circadian units [4].
Our results, then, characterize when the SCN is able to function as the “master clock”
to maintain an organism’s circadian system.
Taken together, the various conditions under which (C, ?) strategies are favored
under each set of assumptions above begin to give us a picture of what characteris-
tics are necessary for this kind of synchronization behavior to occur in the neurons of
such organisms’ SCN. Broadly, we found that the benefits associated to communication
must sufficiently outweigh the cost for communication to be favored and synchroniza-
tion to occur. One specific, ubiquitous example of this theme is our finding that the
largest possible benefit, B(0), must exceed twice the cost of communication, c. In
Section 3.1, we found that under the assumptions of weak selection, B(0) > 2c is nec-
essary for communicative strategies to be favored by the pairwise invasion dynamics,
as seen in condition (28). This is echoed again in Section 3.2, where we found, by
combining conditions (33) and (35), that communication will always be favored when
c < β(∆φ) < B(0) − c, or equivalently, when 2c < β(∆φ) + c < B(0). Thus,
we again see here the need for B(0) to exceed twice the cost of communication. We
proved this condition rigorously, using a different characterization of favorability, in
Section 3.3. It appears again in the low mutation case (condition (56)) of Section 3.4.
The ubiquity of this condition in our results suggests that this is an important charac-
terization of those organisms who exhibit this kind of synchronization behavior in their
SCNs.
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A closer examination of the other results obtained above furthers the broad idea
that the benefits associated to communication must sufficiently exceed the cost for
communication to be favored and synchronization to occur. For example, in the case
of strong selection and low mutation, conditions (33) and (35) demonstrate both that
β(∆φ) must exceed the cost of communication, but also that B(0) must sufficiently
exceed β(∆φ). This relationship (c < β(∆φ) < B(0)− c) also implies condition (25)
in Section 3.1, which describes when (C, ?) strategies perform better than strategies
under the neutral process.
This idea can also be seen in the high mutation case of Section 3.4. In condition
(59), when the mutation probability µ is sufficiently large, the condition characterizing
the favorability of a communicative strategy l simplifies to require
(
〈B(∆φl·)〉 − 1
2
〈B(∆φ··)〉
)
+
(
〈β(∆φl·)〉 − 〈β(∆φ··)〉
)
− c > 0. (69)
The first term here describes the difference between the average B benefit for strategy
l with the average B benefit of all other strategies; the second term does the same for
the average β benefit of strategy l. Thus, this condition requires that the sum of the
average extra benefit a neuron is awarded for having the strategy l must exceed the cost
of communication in order for the communicative strategy l to be favored.
4.1. Conclusions
These initial explorations have affirmed the intuitive idea that the observed synchro-
nization in the SCN requires that the benefits of communication sufficiently outweigh
the cost: the largest possible benefit a neuron may receive by communicating must ex-
ceed twice the cost incurred by communicating. This result is robust as it holds across
multiple different assumptions about the system and represents a foundational step in
undrestanding the impact of evolutionary constraints and trade-offs in the development
of synchronizable circadian systems.
Topological properties of networks of coupled oscillators play a critical role in
determining whether such a system will synchronize. Differences in topology can pro-
mote strong synchronization or weaker partial synchronization in a dizzying array of
patterns - waves [27], chimeric states [28], cluster synchronization [29, 30, 31, 32, 33],
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pinwheels [28], and combinations of these. On the other hand, researchers in evolution-
ary game theory have explored the impact of topology on the emergence of cooperation
among agents in a structured population [34]. Here again, we see a variety of outcomes
– systems that converge to complete cooperation, complete defection, or mixed popu-
lations of defectors and cooperators – and a large body of work delineates topological
structures that facilitate cooperation [34, 35, 36, 37, 38]. A recent sequence of papers
describe topological statistics and signatures that push a system towards cooperation in
pairwise interactions [39, 40, 41] and high-order interactions [42]. This work provides
a first step in exploring how these topologies arise in the context of evolutionary pro-
cesses. While this initial work applies only to the simplest case of developing a fully
connected system of oscillators, the framework easily adapts to more flexible methods
of building connection topologies.
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